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| - | STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE STATES OF CONNECTICUT, ALABAMA, ARKANSAS, CO | DLORADO, |

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE STATES OF CONNECTICUT, ALABAMA, ARKANSAS, COLORADO, DELAWARE, GEORGIA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MARYLAND, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, PENNSYLVANIA, and VIRGINIA

The Attorneys General of the States of Connecticut, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,

(the "Non-Repealer States") file this statement of interest under the Class Action Fairness Act

approval of class settlements. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b). As Congress has explained, the primary

purpose of "requiring that notice of class action settlements be sent to appropriate state and

("CAFA"). CAFA grants the state attorneys general the power to offer their perspective on final

federal officials [is] so that they may voice concerns if they believe that the class action is not in

the best interest of their citizens." S. REP. 109-14, 5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6. "[N]otifying the

appropriate state and federal officials of proposed class action settlements will provide a check

counsel and defendants to craft settlements that do not benefit the injured parties." See S. REP.

against inequitable settlements in these cases" and "will also deter collusion between class

Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia

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CAFA does not set up a timetable for such a statement to be filed before final approval, let alone hinge the filing of such a statement on the deadline for filing objections. *See* 28 U.S.C. §1715(b). The need for the state attorneys general to be heard in this Court only crystalized with the filing of the Report and Recommendation in this case on the final approval of the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiff settlements. Accordingly, the Non-Repealer States now respectfully submit this Statement of Interest to assist this Court in evaluating the proposed settlements, and

allocation of settlement proceeds, of the Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs.

109-14, 14-20, 28, 32-33, 35, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 17-21, 28, 31-32, 34.

The settlement proposed here assigns zero distribution to residents of states that have not passed statutes or that do not have dispositive case law repealing the bar, instituted by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Illinois Brick v. Illinois*, 431 U.S. 720, 729-35 (1977), on recovery of antitrust damages by indirect purchasers. At the same time, the proposed settlement compels a release of these purported zero value claims, whether they be claims for damages or for equitable relief. The Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such result is both unfounded and

The Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this statement believe that such results of the Non-Repealer States filing this states filing this states filing the Non-Repealer States filing this states filing the Non-Repealer States filing the Non-Repealer States filing this states filing the Non-Repealer States filin

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¹ CAFA expressly provides that the states need not weigh in on any given settlement. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1715(f). Accordingly, it misplaces the role of CAFA to interpret the lack of any initial feedback from state attorneys general on these settlements as a factor supporting final approval.

unfair. It is at best an open question as to whether residents in Non-Repealer States may obtain monies by way of the equitable remedies of disgorgement and restitution. The Special Master apparently believes that they may not, but the law is far from settled on that point, as the objection filed by Cooper & Kirkham, P.C. on February 26, 2016 (Doc. # 4437) amply demonstrates.

What is settled, however, is the fact that a release in a settlement is a contract between the parties, construed and enforced as would be any other contract. *See, e.g., Jeff D. v. And*rus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989)("An agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract and its enforceability is governed by familiar principles of contract law"); *McCluskey v. Rob San Servs., Inc.*, 443 F. Supp. 65, 68 (S.D. Ohio 1977)("Generally, a release is a contract, the validity of which is to be determined by reference to the principles of contract law"); *Parish. v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n*, 250 Md. 24, 101 (Md. 1968)("A release, however, is a contract and may be set aside for the same reasons for which any other contract may be avoided"). In order for a release to be valid, there must be consideration. *See Viera v. Cohen*, 283 Conn. 412, 428 (Conn. 2007)("A release acts like a contract and, as with any contract, requires consideration, voluntariness and contractual capacity"). Without any distribution flowing to the residents of Non-Repealer States, there is no consideration to support the release of claims flowing in the other direction. Simply put, if the defendants want a release from residents of Non-Repealer States, then the release of those claims necessarily must have some value to them. If so, they should pay for that release.

Alternatively, if the claims of Non-Repealer State residents truly have no value, then the question naturally arises -- why is a release of a valueless claim required at all? Release is an affirmative defense; it is waived if not pleaded and is not subject to resolution short of a summary judgment. *See In re Cellular 101, Inc.*, 539 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2008)("Settlement and release is an affirmative defense and is generally waived if not asserted in the answer to a complaint"). If the claims are truly barred by *Illinois Brick*, then that is the proper subject of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which if granted will

terminate the case in favor of the defendants far sooner than would pleading and proving the affirmative defense of release.

A situation analogous to the instant case was presented to the courts in *In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig.*, No. 00 CIV. 0648 (LAK), 2001 WL 170792 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) *aff'd*, 42 F. App'x 511 (2d Cir. 2002). In that case, a consolidated price-fixing case against auction houses Sotheby's and Christie's, the class action settlement distributed the recovery to all consumers who had bought or sold through the defendant auction houses only in the United States during the class period. However, the settlement also released claims of consumers who had bought and sold through the auction houses outside the United States, without giving any distribution at all to those consumers. Some consumers, who had claims based on auctions both in and out of the United States, objected to this release. The district court observed that it had already dismissed claims under the Sherman Act by consumers who asserted that they had been damaged by price fixing in foreign auctions and opined:

Nor is there any reason to suppose that Mixed Class Members would be permitted to maintain suits based on foreign law to recover damages suffered in foreign auctions in courts in this country, as any such claims almost certainly would be dismissed on the basis of the forum selection clauses in the terms and conditions employed by both Christie's and Sotheby's. Hence, Mixed Class Members would not be required, as a condition of collecting settlement proceeds in this case, to give up anything of great value.

Id. at *11. Nonetheless, the district court also noted:

Defendants, the Court is told, bargained hard for this release. ... Thus, there is at least some indication that the settlement fund defendants propose to create for the benefit of the class has been enhanced, even if only in a very small way, by defendants' perception that they thereby would gain a benefit at the expense of those with foreign auction claims.

Id. at *13. The district court concluded that "there is no reason why some class members should be forced to give up something of value to enable other class members to benefit from a settlement made richer at their expense," and that "an expanded release requires the allocation of at least some of the settlement consideration to the holders of the claims prejudiced by the

1 expansion " *Id.* at *12-13. For that reason, the district court rejected the settlement. 2 In affirming the district court, the Second Circuit observed "[t]hat the impairment may be 3 slight is of no moment, as we cannot say that it is valueless (indeed, it obviously has value to the 4 Auction Houses that argue so strenuously for approval of it), yet it is exacted without any 5 compensation whatsoever." In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 42 F. App'x 511, 519 (2d Cir. 6 2002). Moreover, this is not an issue that notice can cure. *Id.* ("[A]n unfair settlement should not 7 be approved even if both notice and representation were adequate"). 8 The Non-Repealer States believe that the defendants cannot both eat their cake and have it 9 too. Either the claims have value or they do not. If they do have value, then defendants should 10 pay for their release. If the claims have no value, then there is no need for a release. The Non-11 Repealer States submit that the simplest course of action is for the Court to require removal of the 12 release imposed on the residents of Non-Repealer States who are receiving no distribution. 13 Except as stated herein, the Non-Repealer States take no position on any other aspect of the 14 proposed settlement. The Non-Repealer States, by submitting this CAFA Statement of Interest, 15 do not intend to appear in or become parties to this case. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 4 28

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Case 3:07-cv-05944-JST Document 4462 Filed 03/08/16 Page 9 of 10 1 Dated: March 8, 2016 2 KATHLEEN G. KANE 3 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF **PENNSYLVANIA** 4 By: Tracy W. Wertz Chief Deputy Attorney General 5 Antitrust Section Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General 6 14th Floor Strawberry Square 7 Harrisburg, PA 17102-1410 (717) 787-4530 8 twertz@attorneygeneral.gov 9 LESLIE RUTLEDGE 10 ARKANSAS ATTORNEY GENERAL By: John Alexander 11 Assistant Attorney General 323 Center Street, Suite 200 12 Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Office: 501.682.8063 | Cell: 501.517.4032 13 john.alexander@arkansasag.gov 14 SCOTT PRUITT 15 OKLAHOMA ATTORNEY GENERAL 16 By: Rachel A. Irwin 17 Assistant Attorney General 313 N.E. 21st Street Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 Telephone: (405) 522-1014 18 (405) 552-0085 19 Facsimile: Rachel.Irwin@oag.ok.gov 20 21 **LUTHER STRANGE** ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA 22 By: Billington M. Garrett Assistant Attorney General 23 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 3610 24 334-242-7300 25 bgarrett@ago.state.al.us 26 27 7 28 STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE STATES OF CONNECTICUT, ALABAMA, ARKANSAS, COLORADO, DELAWARE, GEORGIA, KENTUCKY, LOUISIANA, MARYLAND, OHIO, OKLAHOMA, PENNSYLVANIA, and VIRGINIA